Pre-RC assessment, 20 November 2026 · source revision 71d0c41. The relay authenticates a device and limits the routes it can serve. A private application still needs a separate check on who may use it. The proposed pilot assumes a trusted Windows user, trusted publishers, and a VPS administered by OpenBYL. Public Windows distribution and enrollment of unrelated publishers bring additional risks listed below. See the dated build, test, and dependency results alongside this review. Release evidence
The review covers the Rust relay and connector, the local dashboard and desktop wrapper, enrollment and packaging, and the supplied Nginx, systemd, and publisher configuration. Source inspection establishes intended behavior. Independent penetration testing, the deployed Cloudflare account policy, Hostinger firewall state, production filesystem permissions, and a source audit of Burro itself fall outside its evidence.
Who has access to what?
Account pilot update, Beacon and Edge 0.3.0. One invitation creates an account. Approving a laptop gives it an independent client certificate and a hostname prefix. Someone with a device's visitor key can use every private route on that device. Only enter the account password on the Edge account portal. If a visitor key leaks, replace it in the portal. If a laptop goes missing, revoke the device there to disconnect its active tunnel. Making a route private or rotating a visitor key affects new requests. Account and visitor access
The pilot is invite-only. Keep publishers trusted while hosted apps share the openbyl.com domain with first-party services. Edge account cookies are host-only. Operators of other services in the zone should check their own cookie scopes before admitting new publishers. Account pilot verification
| Boundary | What crosses it | Who or what is trusted |
|---|---|---|
| Visitor → Cloudflare → VPS web frontend | HTTPS requests, cookies, and responses. With Full (strict), Cloudflare establishes a second TLS connection and validates the VPS certificate. | Cloudflare and the VPS frontend can read application traffic. The application or configured access gateway decides which visitor may proceed. Cloudflare encryption mode |
| Edge ↔ Beacon | One QUIC connection using TLS 1.3, route labels, control messages, and forwarded bytes. Beacon dials the direct UDP endpoint and verifies its configured certificate name. Edge checks both the client chain and the enrolled leaf fingerprint. | The private CA, Edge, and the holder of the assigned device key. The client chooses the local target for each permitted label. TLS implementation[1] · Relay admission[2] · Beacon dial and forwarding[3] |
| Edge frontend → route listener and Beacon → application | Generated HTTPS sites use HTTP over VPS loopback. On the PC, Add Route opens a TCP connection to the requested IPv4 loopback port. A static route can target another host. | Both hosts and their local workloads. A remote static target introduces a further network hop whose encryption and authentication depend on the application's protocol. Generated website configuration[4] · Static route validation[5] |
| Operator → dashboard → publishing helper | A local state change can disconnect a device or request a hostname. Edge authorizes publishing against the authenticated device, then contacts a private Unix socket. | Local PC processes, the VPS service account, and the privileged helper. A Cloudflare DNS token, when configured, resides on the VPS. Dashboard guard[6] · Publishing policy[7] · Helper socket[8] |
Protections in the implementation
- Named, bounded streams. The wire header carries a validated route name. Beacon resolves that name from its config or a managed route acknowledged for the current session. Edge requires a QUIC address-validation retry where needed, caps simultaneous handshakes at 64, and applies a per-device stream limit. Long-running visitor streams still occupy that budget. Protocol framing[9] · Edge admission and forwarding[2] · Managed route authorization[10]
- Server-side ownership. Edge rejects overlapping publishing prefixes, checks the enrolled owner on every registration, and limits scoped devices to eight managed hostnames within an overall cap of 64 reservations. A reservation retains its hostname, owner name, and loopback port through restart and revocation. Grant validation[7] · Reservation lifecycle[11]
- Browser and helper guardrails. Dashboard mutations require a matching local Host and Origin. The UI sets a content security policy and the desktop restricts embedded navigation to its dashboard origin. The publisher validates labels and port ranges, checks for existing sites, and pins its hostname verification request to a resolved address in the configured Cloudflare ranges. Dashboard HTTP guard[6] · Desktop WebView[12] · Publisher validation[4]
Findings and release decisions
High impact indicates a credible path to disclosure, loss of administrative control, or identity misuse under the stated conditions. Moderate impact indicates operational exposure with a narrower trust assumption or an availability and investigation gap. Each decision applies to the named release or deployment scope.
| ID and priority | Condition and consequence | Proposed release decision or acceptance evidence |
|---|---|---|
| S1 · High for private applications | The generic published virtual host forwards HTTP to the selected origin. It adds no visitor login, path allowlist, or Burro-specific cookie and cache policy. A local app that relies on loopback for privacy can expose its data immediately. Generic vhost[4] · Burro vhost[13] | Before sharing a private route, record its owner and intended access policy. Test a protected endpoint with a fresh signed-out session and an authorized session. For Burro, public health should return 200 and signed-out /api/status should return 401. Burro checks[14] |
| S2 · High for untrusted publishers | Hostname prefixes isolate relay ownership. The generated sites still share the registrable domain. A cookie scoped to openbyl.com can be sent to a tenant subdomain, and a subdomain can set parent-domain cookies. Actual first-party cookie scopes remain unverified. Publishing grants[7] · Cookie domain rules |
Keep the pilot to trusted publishers. Before unrelated parties can host content, isolate their publishing domain from first-party sessions and review cookie scope, CSRF defenses, and isolation between tenants. |
| S3 · High for externally reachable controls | The loopback dashboard uses browser request checks and has no operator credential. A native process with local access can manage it. Add Route rejects its port, but static TOML accepts any valid target, including that dashboard or a LAN service. An externally forwarded dashboard breaks the local trust assumption. HTTP guard[6] · Managed route validation[10] · Static target validation[5] | Review all static targets and frontends. Exclude the dashboard and identify any LAN target explicitly. Keep shared or untrusted local-user hosts outside the pilot until an OS-user or equivalent administrative boundary is implemented and tested. |
| S4 · High for lost device credentials | Each device key is a portable PEM file. A second holder of the same identity can replace the current session and receive its assigned traffic. Uninstall retains the profile. Edge loads its fingerprint registry at startup, so removal takes effect on restart. Retained reservations bind to the device name and can become active again if the same name and grant are reissued to another owner. Session replacement[2] · Reservation restoration[11] · Windows profile handling[15] | Issue one identity per PC. Restrict access to the key and its backups. Rehearse revocation on a test grant and record the time until the old session closes. Keep retired names out of the enrollment pool. |
| S5 · Release gate for public Windows distribution | The reviewed 0.2.2 installer returned NotSigned in Windows Authenticode verification. Build tooling supports signing the OpenBYL release and separately verifies Microsoft's runtime components. Managed Windows policy can block an unsigned installer. Windows build[16] · Release evidence |
For a public Windows RC, sign and timestamp the Beacon executables and installer, including the signed uninstaller path. Verify the release under standard Windows application control and retain its hashes and signature results. |
| S6 · Moderate for availability and attribution | UDP 7844 goes directly to Edge. Raw TCP routes also reach the configured listener directly. The Cloudflare HTTP WAF covers proxied web requests. The built-in admission limits bound concurrent work. Controlling sustained bandwidth and large traffic floods requires separate infrastructure. Beacon keeps 80 recent events in memory. The example Burro and generated vhosts turn off access logs. Admission limits[2] · Event buffer[17] · VPS deployment[18] | Record the permitted listeners and expected client networks. Use VPS or provider counters for traffic and capacity. Assign an incident contact and a journal-retention policy. Keep secrets, cookies, and request bodies out of diagnostic records. |
| S7 · Moderate for privileged publishing | The helper runs as root under systemd restrictions and can change Nginx configuration and certificates. The Unix socket admits members of the Edge group. The optional DNS token can edit the configured zone, and a zone-wide Beacon grant can claim unallocated labels. A source-address allowlist identifies the proxy network. Stronger assurance of a specific Cloudflare account requires separate configuration. Helper service[19] · Socket permissions[8] · Publisher configuration[20] · Cloudflare origin authentication | Restrict the service group and helper files to administrators. Give ordinary devices scoped prefixes, reserve existing first-party names, and restrict any DNS token to the intended zone. Verify Full (strict), frontend ingress ranges, and the origin authentication level required by your deployment. |
Incident response
A device key or laptop is lost. From the VPS, disable its enrolled grant, or remove the static identity and its associated routes. Validate the remaining Edge configuration, then restart Edge during incident response. This disconnects current sessions across the relay. Confirm the retired identity stays offline and a healthy device reconnects. Keep the hostname and port reservations intact. Reissue credentials privately. If the issuer's signing key is affected, plan a new CA and replace the trusted material on both ends. Revocation and rotation[21] · CA recovery[22]
A route exposes the wrong application. On the trusted PC, Stop tunnel immediately closes this Beacon's active streams and all its routes. Disable the affected public frontend or enforce access there before restarting Beacon for other services. Retire the affected route using the server procedure and remove its saved intent from the PC during maintenance. Account for responses that the application allowed a CDN or browser to cache. Review which data the application returned and rotate affected credentials as appropriate. Publishing and retirement[21]
A release needs sign-off. Store the candidate revision, dependency triage, signed artifact hashes, test results, deployment owner, and accepted exceptions together. Repeat the private-route access and device-revocation checks against the release environment. A successful homepage or health response demonstrates reachability only. Release evidence
Repository references
crates/tunnel-core/src/tls.rscrates/edge/src/main.rscrates/beacon/src/tunnel.rsdeploy/publisher.pycrates/beacon/src/config.rscrates/beacon/src/dashboard.rscrates/edge/src/config.rsdeploy/openbyl-publisher.socketcrates/tunnel-core/src/lib.rscrates/beacon/src/publish.rscrates/edge/src/publishing.rscrates/beacon-desktop/src/windows.rsdeploy/burro.nginx.confdeploy/BURRO.mdpackaging/windows/beacon.isspackaging/windows/build.ps1crates/beacon/src/status.rsdeploy/README.mddeploy/openbyl-publisher.servicedeploy/openbyl-publisher.example.tomldeploy/PUBLISHING.md#enroll-another-person-or-devicedeploy/README.md#changes-rotation-and-diagnosis